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Knowledge of factors that influence fertility levels and 
therefore population growth rates could serve as a vital input 
into a variety of policy decisions in developing nations. At this 
tine, there is only limited information on what it is about cou-
ples1 environments, backgrounds, and personal characteristics 
that result in their having many or few children, but among the 
competing theories, two have emerged as leading; contenders--the 
supply or natural fertility theories, and the demand or choice 
theories. These two theories lead to substantially different re-
commendations with respect to policies aimed at lowering popula-
tion groxtfth rates. Efficient resource allocation would, therefore, 
be well served if there were sore evidence as which of these 
theories best fits the fertility behaviour of couples in low 
income and developing nations. As will be evident, my aim in 
this paper is not to settle the demand-supply debate, but more 
to promote and illustrate the tyne of research that can eventually 
establish which theory is correct. 
•k 
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The Competing Theories 
Natural fertility is, in the words of its most famous pro-
ponent, "the fertility of a population that makes no deliberate 
attempt to limit births" fj, p.27. Since natural fertility is 
"primarily a biological phenomenon" (ibid), it follows that in 
populations exhibiting this characteristic, desires for or against 
children play no role in determining resource allocation withing 
families, with completed fertility the, perhaps, unintended con-
sequence of decisions made in other spheres of family behaviour, 
lilhile one might debate why such an important element in a couple's 
life as children would be relegated to the catagory of residual 
claimant in the household decision-making calculus, the concept 
of natural fertility has been a popular one amon^ demographers 
and social scientists, especially as a means of describing demo-
graphic outcomes in traditional and developing societies. 
Henry, in his seminal article on natural fertility, indi-
cated that populations will seldom be observed in a state of 
"true" natural fertility, but modern proponents of this concept 
have broadened it to include populations in which there is no 
observable attempt to avoid pregnancy for the sake of limiting 
family size, and or where couples are vague or unconcerned about 
such concepts as desired family size and "ideal" numbers of 
children. Accordingly, one potential indicator of a society which 
is in or near a natural fertility state is whether couples in 
that society use or demand some form of modern contraception. 
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If there is no use of modern contraception it may be argued that 
parents have no desire to restrict their family size beyond the 
limits imposed by the biological processes involved in concep-
tion and birth.* 
Although somewhat of an oversimplification, in a natural 
fertility population, policies aimed at reducing population 
growth rates are likely to fall into one of two categories — 
those aimed at "educating" couples both about the benefits of 
small families, and about the means of limiting family size 
(modern contraception, in particular), and those aimed at in-
creasing the availability and acceptability of different forms 
of contraception (family planning programs, for example). Casual 
observation would suggest that the majority of population-oriented 
policies in developing nations, and certainly those in Pakistan, 
fall into one or both of these categories and are thus based on the 
assumption of a natural fertility population. 
The demand theory, in its most general form, suggests that 
children are one among many potential avenues through which 
couples can spend their wealth and in that sense fertility de-
cisions should be viewed in the same light as any other consump-
tion decision that couples make over their lifetime. In fact. 
If the reader is uncomfortable with the use of "natural 
fertility" to describe a population in this state, and 
would prefer some other term, so be it. This paper is 
not at all concerned with usefulness of the concept, or 
exact definition of the term, natural fertility. 
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it could be argued that given the sizeable proportion of a 
couple's resources that go toward having and rearing children, 
desires for children could well dominate many other areas of 
family decision-making. 
Regardless of whether fertility desires dominate or are 
simply included in a couple's choice calculus, the main premise 
of the demand theory of family size is that children are not 
showered on parents in some random fashion, but rather are the 
result of implicit or explicit decisionmaking by parents. This 
theoretical framevrork suggests that many of the factors that 
bear on parental decisions to purchase consumption items from 
the marketplace (food, consumer durables, and so on) should also 
affect the "purchase" or production of children, Amnng the 
more important of these factors are the price that parents 
have to pay in order to have and raise another child, and the 
amount of resources that parents have at their disposal, that 
i^ family income or wealth. If children are like other items 
consumed by households, then, as the cost of producing children 
rises, holding family wealth or income constant, the number of 
children desired aiid produced by parents will decline. Conver-
sely if the cost of children remains unchanged but family income 
rises, then parents will want to, and indeed will, consume 
(produce) more children as long as children are normal goods in 
the economic sense of the term. 
While this theory is receiving growing acceptance when 
applied to fertility differences in countries in which a subs-
tantial proportion of the married population uses or has used 
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some form of modern contraception, it is often viewed with con-
siderable scepticism when applied to traditional and developing 
societies. The gist of the criticism leveled at the use of these 
models to understand fertility behaviour of, say, rural villagers 
in Pakistan is that couples in that environment do not think 
rationally or even consciously about the number of children they 
want. Partly this is a "proof of the pudding is in the eating" 
issue-- whether the theory is useful in studying fertility in 
developing nations like Pakistan depends on x<rhether it provides 
a framework or language that helps us better understand some of 
the regularities observed in the behaviour of families and indi-
viduals living in those countries. This is an empirical question 
not resolvable by debating the merits of the theory. 
And partly, the issue centres on what one means by rationality, 
conscious decisionmaking and the like. The important question 
with respect to demand theories is: If people appear to have no 
conscious, or at least only very weak preferences for a parti-
cular number of children, can the demand theory by rejected out 
of hand? If the answer to this question is no, than the only 
means of determining which theory — demand or supply -- is 
valid in Pakistan is through empirical testing. 
Consider the following argument: It is quite possible that 
in traditional societies many household decisions, including 
those on how many children to have, are imbedded in the fabric 
of society; that is, these decisions do not require individual 
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action, and yet were originally based on the sort of economic 
considerations that underlie the demand modal. In other words, 
although couples may base their family size on community norms, 
that is, on the average behaviour of people like them, these 
norms, themselves, have been established on principles similar 
to those underlying the demand models of fertility. 
But even if norms are "rational" in the sense that they 
conform to the predictions of the demand model, 
who originally went through the calculations necessary to arrive 
at these figures? The answer may well be no one person but rather 
society as a whole, with the process looking something like the 
following: At any point in time, and over time, each family can 
be thought of as carrying out an experiment in optimal resotirce 
allocation for the community in which it lives. These experiments 
will consist of some average level of behaviour and outcomes based 
on the behaviour of past generations, and for certain families 
a random element both unexpected and outside the control of the 
couples in question. This random element in couple's behaviour 
supplies the community with information on the relative costs 
and benefit of different life styles for people of similar social 
and economic backgrounds; that is, it supplies information on 
the wellbeing of people who, for reasons unassociated with their 
own desires, stray off the beaten path in one or another area 
of family behaviour. 
As an example, a community will be able to observe the 
costs and benefits associated with small versus large families 
simply through the varying levels of fecundity in the population. 
Some couples, because the wi'fe is, for biological reasons sub-
fecund, will have fewer children than other couples with like 
social and economic characteristics. Over the course of time, 
the community at large will be able to observe how well off, 
happy, rich, etc. these couples are relative to those counles 
with average fertility levels, and thus will know almost insti-
nctively whether, ceteris paribus, they should strive for lower 
fertility. If subfecund cotmles tend on average to be worse off 
in terms of whatever welfare measures the community deems important, 
then future . generations will do what they can to promote high 
fertility. Again, the community will learn of ways to promote 
high fertility by "observing" families whose life styles lead 
3 them to have above-average numbers of children. 
The point of the preceding discussion is not to argue that 
this is the way things are, but rather to indicate that there are 
V 
This is true so long as fecundity varies within as well ass 
among social and economic grouns. 
Fertility reducing or increasing life styles do not necessar • 
correspond to concepts of modern versus traditional families; 
that is, the argument given in the text should not be taken 
as suoport for "modernizing"'theories of fertility decline. 
processes through which people can arrive at "rational" outcomes 
that do not involve complex cost-benefit analyses or even a great 
deal of conscious choice at a particular point in time. Thus, to 
say that people do not plan their fertility, or are vague about 
the number of children they want is not in and of itself a refu-
tation of demand models of fertility. 
If we cannot dismiss on a priori grounds the demand aoproac 
to explaining fertility in traditional societies, what empiricil 
tests are there which might distinguish between the demand and 
the supply models? As will be seen, the difficulty lies in 
developing hypotheses based on the two theories which produce 
different predictions for the relationship betwe 
en ac tu^1 fer ti1it 
behavioxxr and other observable characteristics of couples. The 
stress here is on "observable" since many of the conceptual 
variables in both theories are difficult to measure directly and 
thus are not available in most data sets. For the demand theory, 
some examples are the opportunity cost (value) of the wife's time, 
the price of children, and the family's real wealth, and for the 
supply models, "natural" fecundity, and actual rather than stated 
contraceptive use. It is, infaCt, the use of proxies to measure 
some of these variables that has allowed proponents of demand 
and proponents of supply theories to take the same set of statisti 
on a population and for both to claim victory for their particular 
perspective. 
As an illustration of this phenomenon, consider the follow-
ing regression drawn from some earlier work on socioeconomic 
J 
• . : . • * -9-
determinants of fertility in Pakistan 7 1_7. 
. . . . 
Table 1 
Completed Fertility2 All T^ omen Ages 35 to 49 
./ *'t 
Coefficient T-ratio 
'ealth Proxies: 
1. Husband's Education 0.38 2.0 
2. (Husband's Education)2 -0.09 -2.1 
3. Electricity 0.66 2.6 
4. Pucca 0.64 2.1 
5.. Katcha _ , 0.23 0.9 
Dricc Proxies: 
6. Wife's Education -0.33 3.3 
7. Rural 1 0.1 0.3 
0. Rural 2 -0.03 0.2 
background Variables: 
9. Born village •'* • 0.18 0.8 
10.. Lived in Town 0.07 0.2 
11. Current Age 0.05 2.4 
ther Variables: 
12. Mortality 2.74 6.6 
13. Intercept , »• 3.31 
N= 861 R2 = 0.10 F=7.62 ./ 
Note: See appendix for definition of variables 
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Th e sample for this regression was drawn from Pakistan's 
"lational Impact Survey (NIS) conducted in 1968-69, and consists 
' 4 of currently married women between the ages of 35 and 49. The 
variables and their construction are discussed in detail else-
T-yhere l~1_7* but basic definitions are given in the appendix. 
As the table'indicatesthe proxies used to measure the 
family1 s-wealth position 'are the husband's education, and some 
characteristics of the house in which the family resides. If 
one accepts this interpretation, than the demand theory hypo-
thesis that wealthier families have more children is supported 
by virtually every wealth p r o x y . T h e major price-related proxy 
is the education level of the wife, and, again,under this inter-
pretation the demand argument that higher opportunity cost of 
dfe's time leads to lower fertility is supported.^ And finally, 
the relative." unimportance of the other variables in the regression 
(with the exception of the family's mortality experience) can be 
taken as an indication that so-called cultural differences in 
•ouple's backgrounds play little role in influencing fertility 
if one controls for differences in individual characteristics in 
the population. 
4 The lower end of the age range is designed to restrict the 
sample to women who have completed or nearly completed their 
fertile period. The upper end is a survey-imposed maximum age. 
5 ' 
The relationship between husband's education and fertility is 
particularly interesting in that it indicates that the effect 
of income on fertility tends to decline as income(i.e., husband's 
education) increases. 
The use of schooling as a proxy for the value of wife's time for 
Pakistani women receives strong support from a forthcoming study 
/~3 7 
on the relationship between female schooling and wage 
rates for women who choose to work. 
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Can this regression be taken as validation of demand theo-
ries of fertility in Pakistan? Proponents of supply-oriented ex-
nlantions for variation in fertility would argue that it cannot 
be on the grounds that each coefficient in table 1 can be explain ^  
•'urcly on the basis of supply considerations.'7 One frequently-
raised example is the negative effect of wife's education on the 
number of children ever born to her. Demand theorists treat femal 
education as a price variable, and take its negative sign as an 
indication of the negative slope of a couple's demand-for-children 
unction. In contrast, supply proponents would argue that the neg 
tive wife's education coefficient results not from a behavioural 
response to change in the price of children, but rather from the 
?.ict that more education implies, on average, higher age at marri"1 
and higher levels of contraceptive knowledge and contraceptive 
use. Thus female education "reduces" fertility because it shorten 
the period over which women are at risk of becoming pregnant, and 
">e.cause it acts as a proxy for separating those couples who are 
:.ruly at natural fertility levels from those 
trying to reduce their fertility to levels below those implied by 
natural fertility rates. In this explanation, behaviour, in the 
'Citing sources of the supply explantions given in the text is 
not an easy matter since many have yet to be set down in the 
literature. Some exceptions are: 
"he sources of many of the sunply arguments that I give above 
are discussions and debates on sunply versus demand explanations 
of fertility that have taken place in conferences and private 
conversations over the past several years. Of particular impor-
tance are the recent IUSSP workshop on Household Models of 
Economic-Demographic Decisionmaking in Developing countries held 
in Mexico city in November, 197;r, and private conversation with 
"lichard Easterlin of Pennsylvania University, and John Bongaarts 
of the Population Council. 
-12-
sense of a response to a change in the conditions under which the 
household operates, does not enter the picture. 
The Impact data on which this regression is based allow 
us to determine at least tentatively which of these competing ex-
plan tions is more likely to be true. First, the data give for 
each married x^ om n the age at which she married, so we can control 
"or duration of marriage by including in the regression age at 
marriage along with the wife's current age; second, we can eli-
minate the role played by modern contraception by stratifying the 
oamp1e into those who have ever used and those who have never 
8 
used' any form of modern contraception (the WIS contains detailed 
information on current and past contraceptive use). 
It is important to note that, econoraetrically, neither 
of these "controls" is legitimate because both age of marriage 
ind contraceptive use may be influenced by a couple's desires for 
children; that is, the causal relationship between these variable 
and fertility may not be.undiractional. When a jointly-determine• 
or endogenous, variable is treated as an exogenous variable, as 
is the case in the following empirical work, we run the risk of 
introducing simulteneity bias into the analysis; because of this 
potential bias, those tests can only be viewed as tentative exp-
lorations of the two theories. 
"'See the note; table 2 for the definition of "modern" contra-
ception . 
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Differences betwen the contfV.epting and noncontracepting 
copulations of Pakistan are well illustrated by a sinple compa-
rison of the mean characteristics of the two groups'". These comp-
arisons are given in table 2 in which the sample used for the re-
gression in table 1 is stratified along ever used/never used lines. 
'The most striking comparison is that for the number of children 
ever born for the two groups — contraceptors had on average 1.1 
•"ore children ever- born than those who said that they had never 
used any form of modern contraception. This is true even though 
baratinn of marriage is approximately the sirae for the two groups, 
and female education levels are substantially higher for over-used 
than for never-used women.. Further, mortality levels among the 
children of those couples who have never used contraceptives 
are on the order of 40 percent higher than mortality levels among 
iser's children. The means that for women between 35 and 49 in 
1968-59, those who had ever used contraceptives had on average 28 
•ercent more living children than those couples who had never used 
odern contraceptives. 
While several interpretations can be attached to these 
comparisons I suggest that one strong possibility is that much 
contraceptive use in Pakistan during the Impact era was demand 
ijtermined. Put another way, it was those couples"who""found 
themselves with unexpectedly high numbers of children ever born 
and living children who sought out and used modern forms of con-
traception. This interpretation receives further support if we 
Look not at actual fertility, but at the fertility levels which 
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Table 2 
EVER ^NTRACEPTE D/TTiVER C 0 H TRACE PTE D 
Children ever born 
Husband's Education 
Electricity 
Pucca 
Xatcha 
Wife's Education 
Rural 1 
Rural 2 
i 
Born village 
Lived, in Town 
Years Married 
Current Age 
Age.at Marriage 
Mortality 
Nonusers 
(N=753) 
6.60 
1.33 
0.2.6 
0.23 
0.58 
0.23 
0.39 
0.22. 
0.66 
0.42 
23.77 
40.02 
16.25 
0.25 
Users (N=108) 
7.71 
2 .22 
0.51 
0.57 
0.34 
0.83 
0.32 
0.08 
0.53 
0.62 
23.26 
38.96 
15.70 
0.18 
aContraceptors are .those who have ever used any of the following 
forms of modem contraceptives: condom, diaphram, foam, jelley 
or cream, tampon or sponge, IIU^ pill, sterilization, abortion. 
couples in the two groups could have expected based on their own 
characteristics and the average fertility of couples like then 
(i.e., with the same socio-economic characteristics). Expected 
fertility can be approximated using the estimated coefficients 
in table 1, and the average characteristics for the two groups 
9 
given in table 2. For nonusers, expected fertility based on 
the preceding calculations is 5.61 children per couple, which is 
very close to the actual average fertility for that group (6.50 
children ever born). However, for those who have ever used any 
form of modern contraception, expected fertility is 6.43 children 
ever born which implies that on average these couples had 1.3 
(7.71 - 6.43) more live births than other couples in the popula-
tion with similar social and economic characteristics. 
Thus, it appears that excess fertility above the already 
high mean fertility levels in Pakistan induces couples to search 
out and use modern forms of contraception. Although not central 
to the purpose of this paper, it is worth noting that almost all 
family planning programs, including Pakistan's, are based on the 
premise that supply and availability of contraceptives are the 
factors explaining variations in contraceptive use. While the 
foregoing analysis does not rule this out as a partial explanation, 
it does confirm that demand factors like unexpectedly high fer-
tility also are important in influencing couple's contraceptive 
behaviour; in fact, demand factors appear to dominate contracep-
tive choice decisions. The figures in table 2 also siiggest that 
9 Should anyone choose to check these calculations, please keep 
in mind that the mean vain, of husband's education squared is 
not the square of mean husband's education; the corre'ct averages 
tor husband's education scuared are 5.42 for nonusers, and 9.28 
for users. 
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excess or unwanted fertility occurs only it very high levels of 
children ever born, and therefore that progra*\saimed at reducing 
population growth rates must both eliminate unwanted births, an< 
reduce the number of .wanted or desired births. 
The question that remains is whether wj^h^n the noncontra 
cepting or natural fertility population there is any evidence 
that demand factors are at -work. To answer this question, I 
have recomputed the regression given in table 1 using as the 
base sample only those 753 women who said that they had never 
used any form of modern contraception^ This regression is given 
as eq. 2 in table 3. Eq. 3 in that table adds to the original 
specification the age at which each woman was first married, 
thus introducing iiito the regression i control for duration of 
marriage. The first equation in table 3 reproduces for case of 
comparison the regression given in table 1. 
The change in samples from all women to those who have 
never used modern contraception is an attempt to out the 
correlation between female education and contraception as the 
explanation for the negative partial correlation between wife's 
schooling and fertility. As table 3 indicates, dropping ,:ever-
used!' women from the sample makes the coefficient on wife's 
education more negative and its t-ratio increases; supply expla-
nations based on the education/contraception correlation would 
have predicted a movement in the opposite direction for both 
these magnitudes. 
ri 
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Table 3 
REGRESSION CO^ARISOMS: 
ALL WO'tEH VERSUS HOFUSKRS 
13.Age Married 
14. Intercept T> 
F 
Explanatory Variables^ All Women 
(H=861) 
Nonusers 
(N=753) 
health Proxies eq. 1 eq.2 eq. 3 
1. Husband's education 0.38 
(2.0) 
0.27 
(1.3) 
o .28 
1.4) 
i. (Husband's Education)2 -0.09 
(2.1) 
-0.06 
(1.3) 
-0.05 
(1.4) 
3. Electricity 0.56 
(2.6) 
0.71 
(2.7) 
0.71 
(2.7) 
. Pucca 0.64 
(2.1) 
0.45 
(1.4) 
0.52 
(1.7) 
5. Katcha 0.23 
(0.9) 
0.15 
(0.6) 
0.13 
(0.5) 
^rice Proxies 
. Wife's education -0.33 
(3.3) 
-9.42, 
(3.7) 
.. -0.35-
(3.1) 
7. Rural 1 0.10 
(0.3) 
0.32 
(0.33) 
0.41 
(1.1) 
?>. Rural 2 -0.03 
(0.2) 
0.19 
(0.4) 
0.25 
(0.6) 
Background 
5. Born village 0.18 
(0.8) 
0.02 
(0.1) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
10.Lived in Town 0.07 
(2.4) 
0.24 
(2.1) 
0.23 
(2.5) 
il.Current Age 0.05 
(2.4) 
0.05 
(2.1) 
0.06 
(2.5) 
Other variables 
12 .Mortality 2.74 2.76 2.55 
a. see note, table 2. 
(6.6) 
3.31 
0.10 
7.6 
(6.5) 
3.28 
0.10 
6.7 
(6.1) 
•0.16 
(5.94) 
5.59 
0.14 
9.2 
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To determine whether female education is acting as a proxy 
for "exposure", that_is,,j for the length of...time over which women 
have been at risk of becoming pregnant, aq.3 repeats eq.2 but 
with the addition of age at marriage as an explanatory variable. 
To reiterate, supply-based theories would predict that controlling 
for contraceptive use and duration of exposure ought to substan-
tially reduce the negative partial correlation between female• 
education and fertility. Eq.3 rather strongly rejects this expla-
nation -- the effect of wife's education on children ever born 
is essentially unchanged from eq. 1, both with regard to its 
r - • 10 absolute magnitude, and its significance level. It appears t:.i: 
that even within a "natural fertility" population, and controll.in 
for duration of exposure, increases in female schooling still act 
as a negative influence on the number of children couples want. 
Oamand-based theories would predict this continued negative asso-
ciation; supply theories would not. 
Gumary and Conclusions 
The preceding analysis is concerned with distinguishing 
between two competing theories which attempt to explain observed 
variations in fertility behaviour in developing societies. The 
first of these theories, based on supply considerations like ' 
fecundity, availability of contraceptives, post partum amenoria, 
and a host of other"intermediate fertility" variables, states 
that variations in fertility in noncontracepting populations are 
10The small decrease in the t-ratio can be fully explained by 
the change in degrees of freedom due to the reduction in " " 
sample size. 
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due to factors not directly related c~> couple's desires for chil 
dren. In this theory variations in the number of children that 
couples, have are the unintended consequences of decisions made 
in other areas of family behaviour. 
The second theory is based on a fairly straightforward 
application of consumer'demand theory to explain variations in 
the number of children couples have. Thus, costs of having and 
raising children, and benefits that flow from children to par ant. 
are, under this theory, postulated to explain a significant pro-
portion of the systematic component of variation in numbers of 
children among families. 
In exploring which of these tx^ o theories better fits the 
facts in Pakistan, I have taken one partictxlar partial relation-
ship, that between a wife's education level and the number of 
children she has, and attempted to eliminate the major supply-
related considerations. What remains is assumed to be the dep.an, 
related effect of female education on fertility which states 
that the more highly educated a woman is, the higher is the 
opportunity cost of her time, and the more expensive are children 
to her family. Although flawed by certain methodological probler 
the empirical investigation carried out in this paper points 
strongly toward the conclusion that demand models of fertility 
are just as effective in explaining variations in children ever 
born in "natural fertility" populations as they are in contracep 
ting populations. 
If the conclusions reached above are supported by addi-
tional research that rules out simultensity as an explanation foi 
Cm -J 
the statistical results presented in table 3, then important 
implications for public policy emerge: Population programs that 
attempt to reduce fertility in Pakistan only by improving cont-
raceptive availability and suoplv are unlikely to bring fertili4:r 
down to acceptable levels; counle's desires for children must 
also change and by substantial amounts. 
APPENDIX 
Variable Definitions 
Wealth Variables: 
Husband'-s- Education " 
Electricity 
Pucca 
Kateha 
Price Variables: 
Wife's Education 
Rural 1 
Rural 2 
0ther Vari ables: 
Age Married 
Age 
Mortality 
0: Cannot read or write 
1: can read, not write 
2: can read, write, grades 
T 0,r -7 
3: can read, write grades 
2-5 
4: can read, write, grades 
6-9 
5: can read, write, education, 
other. 
equals 1 if house has electr ici 
equal 1 if house type is pucci 
(modern construction). 
equal 1 if house type is katcha 
(traditional construction). 
see husband's education 
equal 1 for rural residents 
who visit towns frequently 
or occasionally. 
equals 1 for rural residents 
who seldom or never visit 
towns. 
Wife's age at first marriage 
wife's age at the time of th^ j 
survey. 
ratio of child deaths to 
children ever born. 
\ 
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